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and is intentional on behalf of the actors, than the chance event
will have no effect. There are, however, situations of lock-in that
are unintentional, and in such situations a chance event can re-
move this lock-in. The effects depend largely on the adaptive ca-
pacity of the actors to respond adequately and timely to such
situations. The adaptive capacity can be increased (and uncer-
tainty reduced) by a better understanding of both the physical
and the social system. The case studies show that adaptation is
an adequate way of dealing with the occurrence of chance events.
Conclusions. We conclude that the way to deal with non-linear
developments is through an adaptive policy approach with short
feedback loops in order to allow for timely adjustments and
learning loops that will progress the understanding of the sys-
tems – both social and physical. Besides the instruments that
are already available, like modelling and forecasting, instruments
like observation and monitoring, stakeholder involvement pro-
cesses, and learning and adaptation should be developed in this
new adaptive approach. Monitoring of the physical system is a
key element in this approach as all involved parties and stake-
holders can learn how the physical system behaves. In this adap-
tive approach, whimsicality – that occurs through unexpected
events – is an interesting challenge for all concerned with sedi-
ment management.
Recommendations and Perspectives. The proposed adaptive
policy approach should be developed further and should be ex-
perimented with in real life situations that are well monitored.
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Abstract
Background, Aims, and Scope. Sediment management in coastal
zones is taking place in high complex environments. Present
management options do not have a sophisticated way of deal-
ing with the actual complexity of the physical and the social
systems and with the unpredictability that is inherent with these
systems. Therefore, a new approach in both policy making and
sediment management is needed that takes this complexity into
account. The aim of this article is to explore the dynamics in
social and natural systems and to draw the contours of this new
approach for policy processes and sediment management that
fits to the dynamics of the systems.
Methods. Three case studies concerning sediment management
in Germany and the Netherlands are analysed in this article, in
which unpredictability, or whimsicality, appeared through the
occurrence of unexpected events. The case studies are analysed
from the perspective of complexity theory. Complexity theory
is a systemic theory, which means that it explains empirical phe-
nomena from complex system behaviour. To understand the
capricious character of sediment management in coastal zones,
we need to frame the issue as the interdependency between the
physical system and the social system, causing the two systems
to develop in mutual adjustment through feedback. The process
of mutual adjustment is one that is characterised by a non-lin-
ear nature. This is caused by the multiple relationships and the
feedback within and between the systems, and the occurrence
of chance events. Chance events (surprises) happen suddenly
without an apparent cause and are important triggers for change
in the systems. In three empirical cases, the occurrence, nature
and response to these chance events are analysed as these fac-
tors influence the course of sediment management.
Results and Discussion. The case studies show that chance events
can occur in the biophysical and in the social system. In the
three cases, players or actors in the decision process are left with
the choice to adapt themselves to the occurring chance events or
to refrain from any adaptive behaviour. Chance events can open
up new possibilities by activating (new) actors and by coupling
to new issues. If the situation is too locked-in (i.e. a stalemate)
Introduction
The management of sediments in the areas between the river
catchment and the sea requires special attention because of
the high complexity of the system as seen from different
viewpoints: economical, physical, ecological and social. In
estuaries, highly complex relationships exist, and as a result
the physical system can evolve in non-linear and, sometimes,
very erratic ways. These developments are partly driven by
natural causes and partly by human-induced changes. Policy-
makers face difficulties in governing these systems, because
the effects of policies can be hard to distinguish from natu-
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ral developments. In practice, they are frequently confronted
with much uncertainty regarding their policy choices. As
existing computational models are not able to predict re-
sults of measures in the sediment system to the degree of
exactitude that is demanded by policy makers, sediment
operations sometimes show unforeseen events and unpre-
dicted outcomes. This non-linearity and unpredictability of
the behaviour of sediment systems is hard to harmonize with
the linearity of deterministic policies (Otter 2000). Within
the existing deterministic policy paradigm, there are basi-
cally three ways to deal with this problem. The first way is
to ignore this incompatibility and pretend that deterministic
policies are effective. However, this may lead to a degenera-
tion of the physical system, that in turn results in unfavour-
able effects for the social system. The second option is to
follow the precautionary principle, which is currently an
accepted standard practice in environmental policies (Ast
2000, Otter 2000). A big disadvantage of this approach is,
however, that it easily leads to managerial paralysis and lack
of development. The third option is a derivative of the pre-
vious one and is to engage in a meticulous planning process
in order to draw a detailed framework that anticipates many
possible outcomes. This approach seems favourable in the
realm of sediment management (Apitz & White 2003, White
& Apitz 2008). None of these strategies has a sophisticated
way of dealing with the actual complexity of the physical
and the social systems and, above all, with the unpredict-
ability that is inherent to these systems.
In this article the dynamics of the social and the physical
systems are explored so as to derive management and policy
strategies that fit better with the aforementioned dynamic
character of both systems. Three case studies are described
that focus on the responses of policy makers to unexpected
events in both systems that provide a glimpse of the new
policy strategies that should be developed.
1 Complex Systems
River catchment systems can be regarded as highly complex
systems (Macleod et al. 2007, Nguyen et al. 2004, Pahl-
Wostl 2007). As sediments are part of the river system, the
sedimentary system is complex too (Boer 2001, Gurnell
2007, Soler et al. 2007, Owens 2008). This holds true espe-
cially for estuaries and the mouths of rivers in the sea, which
are characterised by highly dynamic processes, dynamic equi-
libriums and the transition from a freshwater to a saline
environment (Blott et al. 2006, Quaresma et al. 2007). In
the past, the common approach to these processes was to
think in terms of 'steady state' systems, but the modern in-
sight is to think in terms of dynamic equilibriums (Peng &
Zeng 2007) or non-equilibrium thinking (Lankford & Beale
2007). To ensure that rivers can provide certain services to
social systems, like safety, transport and navigation, inter-
ventions like river training and dredging are needed. In do-
ing so, natural equilibriums are suppressed and the river is
kept in another state, characterized by other dynamic equi-
libriums or non-equilibriums. These interventions are di-
rected against the natural direction of the physical system,
consequently leading to repeated and costly maintenance
activities in order to maintain that state. A new approach
for sediment management is therefore proposed which goes
with the natural direction of the development of the river
(Salomons & Brils 2004, Owens et al. 2008).
It is not only the (bio)physical system that should be re-
garded as complex. The social system, with its manifold in-
teractions between all actors and complex relationships, is
complex too, as well as the interaction between the social
and the (bio)physical system. The policies that are needed
to govern these systems are faced with major challenges,
especially to integrate different disciplinary backgrounds and
policy domains (Macleod et al. 2007, Pahl-Wostl 2007).
The need to better understand the dynamics of the (bio)physical
system and the interaction with the social system has been
acknowledged (O'Sullivan et al. 2006). Some have attempted
to understand these interactions through advanced modelling
(Otter 2000, Wilson 2006), while others have tried to under-
stand it at a conceptual level (Norgaard 1994, 1995), or em-
pirically at the macro level (Malanson et al. 2006). These ap-
proaches have relatively little explanatory power for what
happens at the actual level of day-to-day (political) decision-
making. Consequently, an approach that focuses on the inter-
action between the physical and social system and that can
cope with the uncertainties that are inherent in these sys-
tems is needed. This need for an integrative view and a new
science of coupled social and biophysical systems has been
recognized recently (Kotchen & Young 2007).
The past two decades saw a rise of the notion that linearity
in systems is actually seldom reflected empirically. This in-
sight has lead to the so-called science of complexity or com-
plexity theory in several disciplines at the same time, rang-
ing from chemistry and biology to environmental sciences
and social sciences (Buuren & Gerrits 2007). Complexity
theory is a systemic theory, which means that it explains
empirical phenomena from complex system behaviour
(Marion 1999) and as such it fits within the holistic think-
ing promoted in sediment management (Apitz 2005). In this
article, complexity theory is applied to sediment manage-
ment and, consequently, the main themes of complexity
theory are presented in this section.
A system is a network of agents or acting units that process
information and act accordingly (Holland 1995). Agents can
be both human and non-human – complexity theory is not
exclusively restricted to natural sciences or social sciences.
However, there are differences between the two types of sys-
tems. Unlike agents in physical systems, agents in social sys-
tems can act intentionally because they have the reflexive
capacity to do so. Because actors or agents are connected,
the consequences of actions resonate throughout the net-
work, depending on the strength of the connections. More
importantly, in the case of social systems actors can antici-
pate, respond, oppose or cooperate, forecast and plan, and
all actors doing that at the same time create a complex pat-
tern of interactions (Henrickson & McKelvey 2002, Hol-
land 1995, Kauffman 1993, Marion 1999, Parker & Stacey
1994, Rescher 1998).
This process of interpreting information and acting accord-
ingly can be understood in terms of feedback. Feedback in
physical systems is the response to changes in the system.
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For example, the building of dykes leading to the decrease
of the absorptive capacity of the estuary is a feedback loop
between the construction and the response of the system
(Peters 2004). Feedback in social systems is the adjustment
of actors because of the input of certain (new) information.
For example, environmentalists can react on certain deci-
sions of politicians because they may expect negative effects
to the physical system. If we understand phenomena as pro-
cesses of feedback within and between systems, and we ac-
knowledge the differences between physical and social sys-
tems, we can frame the management and development of
estuaries as an interaction between social and physical sys-
tems that develop through mutual adjustment over time.
Physical systems adjust to newly created situations, such as
the deepening of a navigation channel, and social systems
equally adjust to the new situations, for instance with policy
and management measures.
A distinction between positive and negative feedback can be
made that applies to both developments in the physical and
social systems. Feedback is the return of a portion of the
output of a process or system to certain input (Parker &
Stacey 1994), with negative feedback having a stabilising
effect whereas positive feedback oscillates progressively
(Prigogine & Stengers 1984). Feedback plays an important
role in the dynamics of the system constantly driving mu-
tual adjustments; although the degree of dynamism can dif-
fer through time (Bergh et al. 2005, Bergh & Gowdy 2000,
Foster & Hölz 2004, Mulder & Bergh 1999). The ensuing
dynamics are characterised by periods of accelerated change
alternating with periods of relative stability, i.e. punctuated
equilibrium. Systems, both physical and social, always tend
towards a state of temporal equilibrium, a more or less stable
situation at a certain time or place. Certain events in the
system can bring the system out of this equilibrium, after
which the system will try to regain the old equilibrium. If
the system is too far from this equilibrium, than a new, some-
times more stable, equilibrium can be reached which alters
the 'state' of the system. Periods of fast change are the result
of a build-up of system pressure that can continue to in-
crease while the system appears to be in a rather stable state
until a certain threshold is reached. Then the system topples
(Bruijn 2004, Hughes et al. 2005, Koppel et al. 2005). As
the threshold has been passed, the old situation cannot be
restored by decreasing the amount of pressure that caused
the system to change. In other words: the amount of energy
needed to change a system back is considerably larger than
the amount that was needed to give it the final push to the
new state. In the case of physical systems, this can be the
increase of suspended sediments leading to a change from
clear water to turbid water (Scheffer et al. 2001). In the case
of social systems, this can be the build-up of public upheaval
over a certain sediment operation such as the deepening of
an estuary, where protest suddenly gains so much momen-
tum that it cannot remain unattended.
An important factor in the conception of non-linear dynam-
ics is the trigger for change and the threshold after which a
certain element in the system will change. Triggers for change
in the systems are generally defined as chance events (Sibeon
1999), as they happen suddenly without an apparent cause
at the time of happening. The subsidence of a dyke is an
example of a chance event which, even if it is a minor local
collapse, can have a major impact on the social and the physi-
cal systems in terms of geometry and, associated with that,
land-use that could last for centuries (Gerrits & Marks 2007).
If there is not enough flexibility in the system, it can easily
enter a 'locked-in' state. Lock-in is the process of getting
fixed in an inflexible or fixed situation because the costs or
energy needed to leave the situation exceed the associated
benefits. Lock-in occurs in both physical and social systems
(Arthur 1994, David 1985, Pierson 2000). While lock-in in
social systems stems from choices made in the past, lock-in
in physical systems stems from choices made by the social
system in the past. An example might be the progressive
construction of dykes that diminishes the potential future
geometry of the water body. The physical system is locked-
in through decisions of the social system.
This theoretical framework allows the analysis of the inter-
actions that exist between the social and the physical sys-
tems to manage sediments. Feedback drives change. As long
as the systems are in a relative stable state (equilibrium), feed-
back will sustain this equilibrium. Systems can be brought
out of equilibrium by the occurrence of chance events, and
consequently the system will change. This notion is impor-
tant for those who manage the sediment systems. Under-
standing the directional force in the dynamics of the sedi-
mentary system is required for meaningful interventions.
When chance events occur that influence the sedimentary
system and its development, it is necessary to be aware of
the occurrence of these events and to anticipate the right
response through understanding the system. The next sec-
tion looks at chance events in empirical cases: the occur-
rence, disposition and response to these chance events de-
termine the course of sediment management.
2 The Case Studies
2.1 Methods and sampling
Three case studies in Germany and The Netherlands were se-
lected, the criteria being that a case should, first, feature a
pressing issue regarding sediment management and, secondly,
is located in the coastal zone. Research that looked at a long
timeframe (Unterelbe: January 1996 – March 2007; Wester-
schelde July 1993 – March 2007; Rijnland: March 2005 –
January 2007) has been carried out in order to note changes,
impacts and responses. Data were collected from three sources:
observations of ongoing policy processes, semi-structured in-
depth interviews, and document research. Candidates for the
interviews were selected according to their role in the policy-
making process regarding a certain case and 'snowball' sam-
pling was applied in order to cover all actors not included in
the initial sample. A total of 60 respondents were interviewed
(Unterelbe: N=23; Westerschelde: N=25; Rijnland: N=12).
Document research consisted of comparing articles from dif-
ferent newspapers to reconstruct events (Unterelbe: Hamburger
Abendblatt, die Tageszeitung; Westerschelde: NRC Han-
delsblad, de Volkskrant, Provinciale Zeeuwse Courant, Re-
formatorisch Dagblad, Financieele Dagblad; Rijnland: n/a),
policy documents and research reports issued by the partici-
pating actors in the cases. The use of contrasting sources
allowed for data validation.
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Observations were carried out during meetings of policy-
makers. During these meetings the current and future poli-
cies regarding the natural system were discussed (Rijnland:
eight meetings; Westerschelde: four meetings; Unterelbe: none
because of time constraints).
These three sources were used to reconstruct the way in
which the three cases developed through time (Gerrits 2008).
The findings are based on these three sources and most of
the statements are supported by the interviewees, although
not necessarily by all of them. The conclusions remain the
interpretation of the authors.
2.2 The Unterelbe estuary, Germany:
Dealing with changes in sediment accumulation
The Unterelbe is an estuary and a tidal river in northwest
Germany that runs from Hamburg to Cuxhaven into the
North Sea. It provides maritime access to the port of Ham-
burg, one of the largest ports in Europe. It also features some
natural elements that are important for estuarine ecology,
such as shoals, sandbars and holms. Its ever-changing mor-
phology and relative shallowness forces the port authorities
to dredge for maintenance and also occasionally to deepen
the main navigation channel. The most recent deepening of
the Unterelbe was finished in December 1999. The new depth
was set at 12.80 meters independent from tidal changes. A
monitoring programme was initiated in order to assess the
consequences of the deepening. However, the port authori-
ties were still concerned that the new depth was not suffi-
cient and during April 2002 the Senate presented its plans
for a new deepening operation. The monitoring programme
had not yet produced any results but according to the direc-
tor of the Wasser- und Schifffahrtsdirektion Nord, the
organisation responsible for the programme, there were no
changes in the estuary other than the ones predicted. The
planning process started during the same year.
An official working group released a preliminary study in
2004, stating that the next deepening would be feasible and
would not have major negative impacts in terms of ecology
and morphology. An advanced 2-dimensional model, devel-
oped by the Bundesanstalt für Wasserbau und Schifffahrt,
was used to arrive at this conclusion. However, at the same
time that this study was presented, the amount of sediments
in the harbour basin doubled. This forced the port authori-
ties to double their efforts to keep the harbour basin free of
sediments. The amount of dredged material increased from
approximately 4.5 million m3 in 2000 to 9 million m3 annu-
ally in 2004. This sudden sharp increase was due to the so-
called tidal pumping effect, i.e. the effect that sediments in
the Elbe are not transported downstream to the North Sea
but are rather transported upstream where they subsequently
accumulate in the harbour basin from where they were origi-
nally removed. The 1999 deepening and the strategy for
maintenance dredging appeared to have reinforced this ef-
fect considerably while this was not forecasted by the model
used in the planning of the deepening operation.
This sediment accumulation posed a major problem for the
policy-makers. It required additional dredging operations.
Furthermore, the fact that the dredged material returned to
the harbour basin again after it had been dispersed in the
Unterelbe, added to the feeling that this circular dredging
constituted a vicious circle in which the same material is
dredged over and over again. Having little additional ca-
pacity to store dredged material, the port authorities and
the City of Hamburg feared being kept in a situation that
would cost them more resources than were available.
However, faced with this unforeseen and unfavourable
change in sediment transport, the port authorities and the
Senate decided to carry on with the planning of a new deep-
ening operation regardless of the new situation (i.e. state) of
the Unterelbe. At the same time a second policy process was
initiated in which a more comprehensive long-term vision
was developed, the so-called 'tidal Elbe' concept that aimed at
a sound management of the estuary in order to avoid more
dramatic changes. The tidal Elbe concept takes the ecological
state of the estuary and its long-term development into ac-
count, whereas the first policy process is aimed at a singular
deepening operation for the lowest costs possible. During au-
tumn 2006, the formal decision to go ahead with the deepen-
ing operation coincided with the presentation of the tidal Elbe
concept but the two processes remained completely discon-
nected. The result, is that the next deepening operation is largely
based on the old premises, whereas the tidal Elbe concept in-
corporating newer ideas about the management of the estuary
and has been moved to the future. A formal reason for the
division between the two processes is that they cover differ-
ent topics, i.e. the work that needs to be done now versus
the work that should happen in the future. However, soci-
etal resistance against the deepening operation continued to
grow, culminating in popular protests.
When analysed through the complexity framework, this case
shows that a continuous strain on the physical system (estu-
ary) does not lead to continuous gradual change but rather
to punctuated change – a positive feedback loop between
the estuary and the strain that is put on it. The punctuated
change was triggered by the most recent deepening opera-
tion. The sudden accumulation of sediments was unexpected
even though extensive research was carried out prior to the
deepening operation in order to understand the possible ef-
fects of the deepening. It is a clear example of an unfavour-
able chance event as it forces the policy-makers to double
their maintenance dredging efforts. There is no easy solu-
tion available: the sediments keep returning and there is lack
of storage capacity.
When planning a new deepening operation, actors within
the social system decided not to wait for the outcomes of
the monitoring programme and went ahead with planning a
new deepening operation as they felt the urge to deepen the
Unterelbe in order to promote shipping to and from Ham-
burg. When the chance event occurred, i.e. when the sedi-
ments started to accumulate rapidly, the planning process
had developed in such a way that reorganising, or even paus-
ing, it was not considered to be of greater benefit than con-
tinuing with the chosen course – even given the potential
risks of more unfavourable effects of doing this. This re-
sponse shows that the current process is too much locked-in
to adapt to the newly created situation. Instead, an alterna-
tive process was started but connections between the two
are almost completely absent. The adaptive capacity of the
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social system was quite low and this in turn has an impact
on the future of the estuary. In its current locked-in state the
planning process now has to decide how to dredge and dis-
pose of the sediments but with limited room to manoeuvre.
2.3 The Westerschelde estuary, The Netherlands/ Flanders:
Dealing with the dependency on a railway network
The Westerschelde estuary in the southwest of the Nether-
lands runs from the port of Antwerpen to the North Sea.
Like Hamburg, the port of Antwerpen is one of the largest
ports in Europe. Similar to the situation in Hamburg, the Port
of Antwerpen aims to deepen the estuary in order to facilitate
larger ships. The Westerschelde features important habitats
and the dissipative character of the morphology helps to pro-
tect against floods. Because the estuary is located on Dutch
territory, the authorities of Antwerpen need to obtain a Dutch
permit for deepening operations. The most recent deepening
operation took place between 1997 and 1998. This deepening
was the outcome of a long negotiation process that lasted al-
most 30 years. The final permission was given after the Flem-
ish authorities agreed with the construction of a high-speed
railway link between Flanders and the Netherlands, thereby
granting an old request from the Dutch government in ex-
change for the deepening of the Westerschelde.
Two years after the deepening operation was completed in
1998, another request to deepen the estuary was submitted
by the port authorities of Antwerpen. Adverse to another
long period of negotiations, both countries agreed to start a
joint process in which the different stakes and research re-
sults would be combined in order to make sound decisions
regarding the estuary. The process was developed within the
framework of the 'Long Term Vision on the Westerschelde',
an outline drafted by a formal bi-national working group
during the years after the initial deepening operation. It stated
that further development of the estuary should be balanced
between economy, ecology and safety. Actors from both sides
of the border are pressed to deliver a good, consensual out-
come – especially after the two national Courts of Audit
criticized the foundations of the previous deepening opera-
tion and the European Commission sent a formal warning
that the compensating ecological measures were insufficient.
This open planning process lasted for three years and the
plans were presented in a development outline during au-
tumn 2004. Besides deepening operations it proposed some
additional measures that provoked considerable public resis-
tance, such as the creation of floodplains and realigning the
dykes further inland. These responses were not unexpected.
However, the presentation of the proposals coincided with a
report on the construction of the high-speed railway link men-
tioned above. The construction was well underway but it ap-
peared that trains would have to travel 17 minutes longer than
expected. Eight minutes are lost, seemingly due to a mistake
in the calculations regarding the Flemish part of the track.
There is also disagreement over the frequency of the service.
The Dutch parliament then suddenly demanded that the Min-
ister of Public Works and Transport would send an ultimatum
to the Belgian government: no deal over the railway link meant
that the Dutch parliament would not agree with the deepen-
ing of the Westerschelde. For the Flemish parties, suddenly
the laborious negotiations over the past four years appeared
to be futile as it all seemed to depend again on the railway
link. However, the ministers of both countries accepted that
they could not put the Westerschelde deal at risk and agreed
on a settlement. The Dutch government accepted that the
railway link will be slower than expected, and the Flemish
authorities promised to modify the track and to pay for more
frequent services. If losses occur the Belgian railways will
pay these. Consequently, the planning of the deepening op-
erations could go ahead.
This case shows how events in the social system that are
seemingly insignificant – because they are not related to the
natural system in any way – can have a considerable impact
on the decision-making regarding the management of the
estuary. The (re-)occurrence of the high-speed railway as a
negotiation asset came unexpectedly and was considered
unfair by the sediment managers as they thought that such
an issue should not influence decisions regarding the physi-
cal system. However, the reoccurrence was a fact. The plan-
ning process towards a decision regarding the estuary in 1997
had become locked-in, because there was no extra benefit
for both sides to move to a new position. The coupling with
the railway issue was a chance event that enabled parties to
change their position and as such enabled a decision that
may have been impossible without this chance event. The
circumstances allowed for sufficient system pressure (the
railway issue) to pass the threshold and initiated a system
change (a decision regarding the estuary). The second time
this issue occurred, the situation in the social system was
the opposite of the one in 1997. This time there was no
locked-in situation between the two sides but rather con-
sensus over a well-funded plan for the estuary. Attempts to
re-link this to the railway issue were in vain because the
adaptive capacity of the actors meant that the railway link
as a negotiation asset could not build up enough system pres-
sure to cause a change. Although the issue itself caused some
turbulence within the social system, it never gained enough
momentum to come to fruition. This does not mean that the
social system has become rigid, and locked-in, but it means
that it was able to adapt itself in such a way that the pres-
sure was diverted. The agreement over the deepening opera-
tion covered enough aspects to satisfy most actors.
2.4 The Rijnland area, the Netherlands:
Dealing with changing planning processes
The Rijnland water board is one of the oldest water boards
in the Netherlands. It governs the polder areas in the west of
the Netherlands close to the sea, roughly between the cities
of Gouda, Den Haag and Haarlem. As water boards are
responsible for the water quality and quantity issues in their
areas, they are also responsible for dredging the polder ca-
nals and ditches. The Rijnland water board has refrained
from dredging the water network in the polders for decades
and therefore a backlog had occurred. This called for a swift
and major dredging operation. The accumulation of sedi-
ments compromised the water quantity and quality, dimin-
ished ecological life and hindered economical and recre-
ational use of the water bodies. In some areas the muddy
riverbed was almost exposed.
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The potential dredging operation may appear to be simple
at first glance because of the low physical complexity, but
the Rijnland area is densely and diversely populated with
stakeholders ranging from farmers to urban inhabitants. To
avoid public resistance at the onset, a process of stakeholder
involvement was established. From the different stakeholder
groups (farmers, resident committees, environmentalists,
recreation associations, angling associations, local authori-
ties, etc.) representatives were invited to join the participa-
tory planning process. They were asked to think with the
water board about the way the dredging operation should
be carried out.
The process of stakeholder involvement was designed as a
series of six workshops. The first workshop covered the ar-
ticulation of the (associated) problems by the stakeholder
groups, the second workshop was meant to create visions on
future sediment management options. From then onwards,
the stakeholders would turn these visions into present plans
for managing the sediments, exchange knowledge with ex-
perts in order to improve the plans, and finally present the
most favourable sediment options. This process started at the
beginning of 2006 and ended in December of that same year
and was meant to give direction to the dredging activities.
The first and second workshops took place as planned.
However, during the third workshop in which present sedi-
ment options were discussed, the stakeholders started to
protest. During this session the stakeholders developed di-
verse plans for sediment management, ranging from the more
common solution, such as in-situ storage, to solutions of
using it to grow flowers for commercial purposes. In this
workshop, the stakeholders contested the water board as
they did not trust the water board. Stakeholders stated that
until now they were not given the feeling that they were
participating in a clear and transparent process. On the other
hand, the water board felt the pressure to generate solutions
in time so as to keep to the tight schedule of the decision
making process, and this put some pressure on the genera-
tion of sediment management options. This contributed to
the feeling of the stakeholders they were manipulated by the
water board as it looked like they already had planned what
to do, regardless of the ideas of the stakeholders. This left
them with the feeling that their effort was useless.
As soon as the protests were expressed, a 'time-out' was
called for and the problems were discussed. In this time-out
session, it was agreed that a small group of representatives
from the stakeholder group would discuss the process sepa-
rately with the water board. In this separate meeting, the
representatives of the stakeholders expressed that they want-
ed to respond to the plans of the water board rather than
putting time and effort in developing their own plans. They
also wanted to have discussions with people who live in the
area as they found the input of local knowledge was lack-
ing. This redesign of the process was discussed in the fol-
lowing, fourth, workshop with all stakeholders and was
implemented after approval by all stakeholders and the wa-
ter board. The water board came up with several options
for disposal of the dredged material, that included disposal
in gravel pits, elevating agricultural areas, and elevating dykes
and quaysides. Two local workshops in the area were or-
ganised and attended by local people who discussed the fea-
sibility of the proposals. The process ended with a clear,
appreciated and approved list of options that provided a
sound basis for the disposal of the dredged materials. A
number of suggested disposal sites were cleared from the
list as it turned out that they were too expensive or project-
ed in areas that would not be able to cope with the environ-
mental damage that could be caused by storing contami-
nated sediments. On the other hand, the local people came
up with new solutions for sediment disposal in the area, like
using dredged material at new building sites. At the end of
this process, the generated sediment options outnumbered
the list the water board had originally drafted and the total
disposal capacity was more than enough to dispose of all of
the dredged material.
The chance event in this case was the protest of the stake-
holders during the third workshop that came as a surprise
to the water board because, until then, they had perceived
support from the stakeholders. The way the different sedi-
ment management options were presented triggered this re-
lease. However, given the fact that the process was still in an
early stage and had not become locked-in, the protest did
not result in a stopping of the process but instead resulted in
a change of the process architecture that was deemed
favourable by all. This change can be attributed to the adap-
tive capacity by all actors: the water board accepting that a
change was necessary, and the stakeholders who advocated
the change of the process architecture. The process as a whole
resembled a search through the possibilities rather than the
application of a rigid framework, and in the end it resulted
in a sound decision.
3 Reflection on the Case Studies
The following lessons can be drawn from the case studies.
First of all, virtually all cases of sediment management op-
erations are difficult or impossible to control despite well-
intended efforts. Secondly, chance events can open up new
possibilities but the adaptive capacity of the social system is
a requisite for dealing with chance events. Even systems that
are locked-in can be reactivated to move again if the lock-in
occurs without intention on behalf of the actors. Chance
events are likely to occur in any case although their emer-
gence is localised in time and space and the frequency may
differ. However, the fact that chance events can occur means
that sediment managers need to deal with them and should
be prepared for them.
The whimsical nature of chance events has important con-
sequences for the planning of sediment management opera-
tions. As shown in the case studies, a chance event can be
both of a physical and a social nature and both types have
an impact on the management of sediment systems. This
means that chance events cannot be controlled: they happen
unexpectedly and can occur anywhere. The case studies il-
lustrate that the occurrence and development of these events
takes place independently from the attempts of actors to
steer them. The actors are left with the choice to adapt them-
selves to the new circumstances or to refrain from any adap-
tive behaviour.
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The directional nature of the chance events, i.e. the fact that
they are important factors influencing the final outcomes,
means that adaptive behaviour is almost inevitable. All three
case studies show attempts by the actors to deal with the
chance events. In the case of the Unterelbe estuary, the pro-
cess was too locked-in to change completely so the only ad-
justment was that an economically efficient solution for the
tidal pumping effect had to be developed. However, there
was inability to incorporate the tidal Elbe concept in the
current deepening operation, even though this connection
may lead to favourable results. In the case of the Wester-
schelde estuary, inability to adapt to the new circumstances
in 1997 could lead to a prolonged dead-lock, whereas in a
second situation it could lead to the destruction of a sound
agreement over the estuary. In the case of Rijnland area, the
adaptive behaviour of the actors prevented the withdrawal
of the stakeholders and increased support for the dredging
operation. The ability to adapt to the unexpected events and
new situation on the one hand provides opportunities to
continue projects but on the other hand reinforces the direc-
tional nature of the chance events because acknowledging
and moving along means that the actors have an acknowl-
edged impact on the process.
Although chance events are by nature unexpected, they
should be met with adaptive behaviour. The degree of un-
certainty can be reduced by a better understanding of the
system and a higher awareness of the system pressure within
both the physical and the social system. It takes consider-
able system pressure for changes to take place but once these
changes take place, they can be far-reaching. Being aware of
the build-up of system pressure may lead to a better under-
standing of sediment management as managing complex
adaptive systems, rather than stable (mechanical) systems.
In all three case studies, the pressure on the system was
present but unnoticed. The continuous strain in the Unterelbe
case, the reoccurrence of the railway issue in the Westerschel-
de case, and the dissatisfaction of the stakeholders in the
Rijnland case are all examples of the build-up of system pres-
sure that, once enough momentum was gained, triggered a
number of changes.
The case studies show that adaptive behaviour provides an
accurate way of dealing with the chance events. This brings
the focus to the final aspect of this analysis, the emergence
of lock-in. The cases show that there are situations of lock-
in that are, to a certain degree, unintentional. In such situa-
tions, a chance event can lift this lock-in. However, if the
lock-in is intentional, as is the situation in the Unterelbe
case, a chance event may not be able to lift this lock-in.
Adaptive behaviour depends on the character of the lock-in,
i.e. whether this is intentional or not.
4 Conclusions and Recommendations
In this article we distinguish between the physical and the
social system in sediment issues, but we also argued that
they are very strongly connected. The systems develop
through mutual adjustments that can be seen as the results
of positive and negative feedback in and between the sys-
tems. In this way both systems co-evolve in time. Changes
in the system are the result of a build-up of system pressure.
Chance events have the directional power to guide processes
in new, sometimes unforeseen directions. The responses to
these unexpected events are, therefore, very important to
keep both systems well connected.
In the case studies, unexpected events occurred and in all
cases this had an effect on the sediment issues that were at
stake. In all cases these events provoked a response of the
social system and, when these reactions were implemented,
it sometimes speeded up the process to reach agreements
(e.g. Rijnland and Westerschelde cases) or it did not have an
effect yet (e.g. Unterelbe case). The case studies also show
that from the onset policy systems have a tendency to adopt
a control-seeking approach towards the physical character-
istics of the system. Acknowledgement of the capricious
nature of the biophysical system leads to stricter managing
in an attempt to cover all eventualities, extended research in
order to render an extensive and definite image of the work-
ings of the biophysical system, and a meticulous and rigid
planning of the whole operation. After the operation is car-
ried out and the results appear, the cycle is repeated. How-
ever, the chance events will still occur and such a rigid ap-
proach can worsen the state of the system, and can easily
lead to a locked-in situation because it lacks flexibility.
Therefore, the policy repertoire should be extended with
other strategies. We argue that the best way to deal with
these non-linear developments is through an adaptive ap-
proach with short feedback loops in order to allow for timely
adjustments and learning loops that will progress the un-
derstanding of the systems – both social and physical. Flex-
ibility in goals and the methods used is necessary (Gold-
smith & Eggers 2004). The policy strategies that are needed
in this approach differ very much from the directive,
centralised, command and control strategies that are in
vogue with present policies. Strategies that are needed in
complex situations are directed towards preserving the dy-
namics in the systems, moving with the dynamics of the
system (instead of against it) and towards keeping the so-
cial and physical systems very well connected through feed-
back and learning.
The main instruments and methodologies in this adaptive
policy approach are observation and monitoring - besides
prediction and modelling in the present approaches that are
still valuable - stakeholder involvement in the policy pro-
cess, and in the application of instruments like modelling
and monitoring, and learning and adaptation (Hisschemöller
et al. 2001, Owens et al. 2008), instead of dictating to the
physical and social systems what to do and how to behave.
Monitoring of the physical system is a key element in this
approach. From monitoring results all involved stakehold-
ers can learn how the physical system behaves. Measures
that are needed to bring the biophysical system in a
favourable state, can be discussed and implemented. The
effects of the measures can then again be monitored and
adjustments can be proposed, in such a way that the dy-
namics in the system will be preserved. In this adaptive ap-
proach, whimsicality is not a burden but an interesting chal-
lenge for all concerned with sediment management.
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